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We study how the distribution of other-regarding preferences develops with age. Based on a 
set of allocation choices, we can classify each of 717 subjects, aged 8 to 17 years, as either 
egalitarian, altruistic, or spiteful. Varying the allocation recipient as either an in-group or an 
out-group member, we can also study how parochialism develops with age. We find a strong 
decrease in spitefulness with increasing age. Egalitarianism becomes less frequent, and 
altruism much more prominent, with age. Women are more frequently classified as 
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1.  Introduction 
Other-regarding preferences are a fundamental cornerstone in the human ability to cooperate 
in large groups of genetic strangers (Bowles, 2004; Boyd and Richerson, 2005). This raises 
the important question how other-regarding preferences develop in human life, in particular 
examining the age at which other-regarding behavior sets in. Recent research has focused on 
the development of the upside of other-regarding preferences by showing that egalitarianism 
(Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach, 2008) and efficiency concerns (Almås et al., 2010) become 
more prominent as children and teenagers get older. However, theory suggests that other-
regarding  behavior  in  groups  may  co-evolve  with  parochialism,  a  potentially  harmful 
downside  of  other-regarding  preferences  (Choi  and  Bowles,  2007).  The  development  of 
parochialism  –  implying  in-group  favoritism  and  out-group  hostility  –  has  received  little 
attention  so  far  (see  Bernhard,  Fischbacher  and  Fehr,  2006;  Goette,  Huffman  and  Meier, 
2006, for studies with adults). The same holds true for the development of spitefulness, a 
human trait that leads to punishment against cooperative group members. While spitefulness 
seems to be a robust phenomenon of a non-negligible minority of adult subjects (Falk, Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2005; Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter, 2008), nothing is known so far about 
the relative frequency of spiteful behavior in childhood and adolescence and how it might 
change with age. 
In this paper, we study in a unified framework how both benevolent and malevolent 
other-regarding preferences develop in a sample of 717 subjects aged 8 to 17 years. We allow 
each subject to make three simple allocation choices from which we can infer her preference 
type as either egalitarian, altruistic, or spiteful. Egalitarian types prefer allocations that yield 
equal payoffs for both parties over those with unequal payoffs. Altruistic types value the other 
person’s  payoff  positively,  and  spiteful  types  put  a  negative  value  on  the  other  person’s 
payoff. We also vary whether the recipient of the allocation is an in-group or an out-group 
member, in order to study parochialism and how it develops with age. We find a strong 
decrease  of  spitefulness  with  increasing  age.  Egalitarianism  becomes  less  frequent  and 
altruism  much  more  prominent  with  age,  implying  that  the  choice  of  the  pie-maximizing 
allocation increases with age. Women are more frequently classified as an egalitarian type 
than men are, and less often as altruistic. Interestingly, parochialism in the form of a worse 
treatment of out-group members, compared to in-group members, emerges and first becomes 
significant  in  the  teenage  years.  Hence,  while  altruism  becomes  more  important  in 
adolescence, we observe more discrimination against out-group members at the same time. 3 
 
Studying  the  benevolent  and  malevolent  aspects  of  other-regarding  preferences  is 
important  because  knowledge  about  other-regarding  preferences  is  key  in  designing 
institutions  and  their  associated  incentives.  In  particular,  egalitarianism  (i.e.,  inequality 
aversion) and reciprocity are likely to be important in employer-employee relationships in 
labor markets (Bewley, 1998). Negative other-regarding preferences – like spite – have been 
found to be influential on behavior as well, for instance by inducing sabotage in tournaments 
(Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2010). Beyond influencing behavior in small-scale groups, other-
regarding preferences may also shape a society decisively by affecting decisions on social 
welfare, tax evasion (Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval, 2007), or charity (Vesterlund, 2003). 
While  many  studies  have  examined  other-regarding  preferences  in  adults  (see 
Camerer, 2003, for a survey), much less is yet known about how these preferences develop 
with age, in particular before humans enter working life. Studying the development of other-
regarding preferences is interesting for several reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective, it 
can illuminate how models of economic behavior (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) can account for the behavior of children and 
teenagers. These models were developed on the basis of experimental evidence from adult 
subjects,  but  it  is  unclear  whether  adult  behavior  is  the  consequence  of  any  directional 
development  in  the  prevalence  of  other-regarding  preferences.  The  fact  that  economic 
decision  making  “may  well  change  over  the  long  term,  with  changes  in  age,  education, 
political and religious beliefs, and other characteristics” (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, p. 171) 
has  been  well  acknowledged.  In  our  paper,  we  hope  to  contribute  to  a  more  detailed 
understanding  of  how  age  influences  distributional  preferences.  Second,  from  an  applied 
perspective, knowing more about the different types of other-regarding preferences and their 
intensity in childhood and adolescence can provide a benchmark against which adult behavior 
can be measured. A comparison of the intensity of benevolent other-regarding preferences 
observed in adulthood compared to childhood and adolescence is of great interest. If it is 
stronger  in  adulthood,  this  would  imply  that  socialization  in  the  teenage  years  should  be 
considered as helpful for promoting efficient interactions in the workplace; if it is weaker, 
humans  would  seem  to  “lose”  efficiency-promoting  other-regarding  preferences  in  the 
transition from childhood to adult age. Finally, from a policy perspective, if other-regarding 
preferences  were  to  be  found  to  be  susceptible  to  policy  interventions  in  education  –  a 
question  that  is  still  open  to  thorough  investigation  –  knowing  the  distribution  and  the 
developmental  changes  of  other-regarding  preferences  during  childhood  and  adolescence 
would be a prerequisite for any kind of intervention. 4 
 
The economic decision making of children and adolescents has received increasing 
attention  in  recent  years.  William  Harbaugh  and  Kate  Krause  pioneered  the  systematic 
investigation of how children make economic decisions in a wide array of domains, such as 
rationality  in  revealed  preferences  (Harbaugh,  Krause  and  Berry,  2001),  risk  taking 
(Harbaugh,  Krause  and  Vesterlund,  2002),  or  trust  and  trustworthiness  (Harbaugh  et  al., 
2003b). As far as other-regarding preferences in children and teenagers are concerned, the 
overall evidence seems to suggest that humans become less selfish as they age (Murnighan 
and  Saxon,  1998;  Harbaugh,  Krause  and  Liday,  2003a;  Benenson,  Pascoe  and  Radmore, 
2007; Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Gummerum et al., 2008, 2010). These studies, however, have 
concentrated  on  a  binary  classification  of  more  or  less  selfish  behavior,  preventing  the 
classification  of  subjects  into  different  types  of  other-regarding  preferences  and,  hence, 
leaving the investigation of how the distribution of types changes with age open. 
Fehr et al. (2008) took a first step in classifying different types of children’s other-
regarding preferences by devising three simple allocation tasks from which they can infer a 
subject’s type as egalitarian, altruistic, or spiteful. Their experiment with 229 children aged 3 
to 8 shows that egalitarianism (i.e., inequality aversion) develops strongly between the ages of 
3 and 8. While selfishness clearly dominates in 3-year-olds, many 7 to 8-year-olds prefer 
egalitarian allocations. More precisely, about 60% of children aged 7 to 8 can be classified as 
having  egalitarian preferences, while the  corresponding share for 3 to 4-year-olds is only 
20%.  We  use  the  experimental  design  of  Fehr  et  al.  (2008)  and  extend  their  analysis  to 
adolescence in order to study how the transition to adulthood shapes subjects’ other-regarding 
preferences. This will allow us to bridge the gap between children (as in Fehr et al., 2008) and 
adults. 
The age span considered in our paper is similar to that investigated in a recent paper 
by Almås et al. (2010) on the development of inequality acceptance. They ran experiments 
with 486 subjects, aged 10 to 18, who had to make distributional choices in modified dictator 
games where the pie to be distributed could depend – in addition to own productivity – on 
luck and the efficiency of giving away money to the recipient. They found that older children 
are  more  willing  to  accept  inequalities  when  the  latter  are  the  consequence  of  individual 
achievements;  furthermore,  they  care  more  about  efficiency  than  younger  children  do. 
Overall, their findings imply that children’s fairness norms evolve from favoring equality in 
their youngest cohort of 10-year-olds (similar to 8-year-olds in Fehr et al., 2008) to favoring 
equity in the older age groups. Compared to Almås et al. (2010), our design also allows us to 
study  the  development  of  spitefulness  and,  in  particular,  the  influence  of  parochialism. 5 
 
Studying both spite and parochialism will shed light on the malevolent side of other-regarding 
preferences. This is also important from a theoretical point of view, since recent evolutionary 
theories suggest that prosocial behavior (i.e., the benevolent side) and parochialism (i.e., the 
malevolent side of other-regarding preferences) evolve jointly (Choi and Bowles, 2007). An 
examination of common developmental origins of the benevolent and malevolent aspects of 
other-regarding preferences is therefore of great interest. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the experimental design 
and procedure in section 2. Section 3 presents the results, and section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  Experimental design and procedure 
2.1.  Design 
Participants in our study had to make decisions in three simple allocation tasks that we will 
refer to as games below.
1 Each participant was matched with one anonymous partner from the 
same age cohort, and had to choose between two allocations that assigned money between the 
two players. 
The prosocial game offered a choice between the allocation (1,1) – that is, 1 point for 
the decision maker, 1 point for the recipient – and the allocation (1,0). This game serves as a 
measure of the most basic form of prosociality, namely the willingness to avoid advantageous 
inequality for the benefit of the partner. Importantly, prosociality in this game has no costs for 
the decision maker, enabling various different motives to drive the choice (1,1): an egalitarian 
preference that avoids inequalities (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), 
efficiency-seeking (Charness and Rabin, 2002), a desire to maximize the payoff of the worst-
off subject (maximin; Rawls, 1974), or even self-interested behavior because a purely self-
interested individual would randomly choose between the two allocations as she receives one 
point regardless of her decision. 
In the envy game, the decision maker had to choose between allocations (1,1) and 
(1,2). As in the prosocial game, the decision maker can increase the partner’s payoff at no cost 
to herself, but now this choice results in disadvantageous inequality. Looking at a subject’s 
pattern of choices in both the prosocial and the envy games allows distinguishing inequality 
                                                 
1 Of course, the allocation tasks are not interactive games, but rather individual decision making tasks. However, 
for notational convenience, we prefer the term “game” for the three different tasks. 6 
 
aversion from a motive to be altruistic towards the partner by increasing his payoff, or from a 
motive  of  spite  that  minimizes  the  partner’s  payoffs.  If  an  individual  wants  to  avoid 
inequality,  she  chooses  (1,1)  in  both  games.  An  altruistic  individual  who  cares  for  the 
partner’s payoff, however, would choose (1,1) in the prosocial game and (1,2) in the envy 
game. A spiteful individual, finally, would pick (1,0) in the prosocial game and (1,1) in the 
envy game. 
The sharing game let subjects choose between allocations (1,1) and (2,0). Contrary to 
the previous games, the egalitarian choice of (1,1) is costly for the decision maker and thus 
indicates a strong form of inequality aversion. Note that the prediction for a selfish decision 
maker implies unambiguously the choice of (2,0) in this game, while picking the egalitarian 
option clearly indicates prosocial behavior. 
Considering  a  subject’s  pattern  of  choices  across  all  three  games  allows  the 
classification of different types of other-regarding preferences. In particular, we will classify 
subjects  into  five  behavioral  types.  Strongly  egalitarian  subjects  pick  the  egalitarian 
allocation  (1,1)  in  all  three  games.  Weakly  egalitarian  subjects  choose  the  egalitarian 
allocation in all games except the sharing game, where egalitarian behavior is costly. Strongly 
altruistic subjects always select the allocation that maximizes the partner’s payoff. Weakly 
altruistic  subjects  opt  for  the  allocation  that  maximizes  the  partner’s  payoff  in  all  games 
except the sharing game. Finally, spiteful subjects always prefer the allocation that minimizes 
the partner’s payoff. Table 1 summarizes the classification of subjects. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In order to study the development of parochialism, we implemented an in-group and 
an out-group condition across subjects. While the recipient in the in-group condition was 
known to be from the same class (his or her identity remained secret, of course), the recipient 
in the out-group condition attended another school, but was in the same grade. This was 
common knowledge to students (see the instructions in the Appendix). The in-group condition 
was implemented in two different ways. In the “in-group all” condition, all students from a 
respective class participated once as sender to another in-group member and once as recipient 
of a transfer from another in-group member in the experiment. In contrast, only half of the 
students from a respective class participated in the experiment as sender the “in-group half” 
condition, while the remaining students acted as recipients of the senders’ transfers and thus 7 
 
did not make any decisions. We chose the in-group all condition as a method to collect more 
data from our subject pool.
2 
 
2.2.  Subject pool and procedure 
This experiment was part of a 2-year project run in seven schools in Tyrol, which is a federal 
state in western Austria. The project was approved by the State Board of Education in Tyrol, 
and the headmasters of participating schools gave permission to conduct several experiments 
in intervals of two to three months. These experiments were run in class during regular school 





th grades at the 
beginning of the project, and followed them for two school years. Parents were informed 
about the project, which was described as a scientific project that studies decision making in 
children  and  teenagers,  but  without  revealing  any  details  on  any  of  the  experiments.  All 
students except five received their parent’s permission to participate in the project. Besides 
asking parents for consent, we also solicited each student’s willingness to participate in the 
experiments.  No  single  student  dissented.  This  whole  procedure  constitutes  a  particularly 
noteworthy feature of our experiment, as it avoids any kind of problems due to self-selection 
into an experiment. Self-selection is absent in our study, thus distinguishing it from previous 
experiments with children and teenagers. 
This experiment was run in June 2008. It was carefully explained in class, and all 
participants had to answer two control questions to check their understanding before starting 
the experiment (see Appendix). We proceed in our analysis with those 717 participants in the 
role  of  a  decision  maker  who  answered  both  questions  correctly,  and  exclude  35  other 
decision makers with incorrect answers from the following analysis (see Table 2).
3 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The  points  earned  in  the  experiment  were  converted  into  Euros  for  payment.  The 
exchange rate was made proportional to the average weekly pocket money within each grade 
                                                 
2 Separate χ
2-tests for each age group and game reveal that no significant differences between the two in-group 
conditions could be observed (see Table A1 in the Appendix), allowing us to pool the data from both conditions. 
3 It is important to note that none of the results presented below would change in substance (and significance 
levels) if the 35 excluded subjects were included in the analysis. It is also noteworthy that in addition to the 752 
decision makers, we had 443 subjects as passive recipients of the decision makers’ choices. Recall that 309 
subjects (out of the 752 decision makers) participated in the in-group all condition where they were both active 
decision makers and passive receivers. 8 
 
(see  Table  3).  This  approach  was  taken  to  ensure  that  the  marginal  incentives  were 
comparable across grades. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Finally, we would like to mention that the use of one-shot games under anonymity, as 
in this study, is a key factor in distinguishing prosocial behavior from purely selfish motives. 
Selfish motives may also play a role in repeated interaction or face-to-face contacts, meaning 




3.  Experimental results 
Below  we  will  first  analyze  behavior  in  single  games,  followed  by  the  pattern  of  other-
regarding  preferences  that  emerges  when  all  three  decisions  of  a  subject  are  considered. 
Within each subsection, we proceed with an analysis that addresses the influence of (i) age, 
(ii) parochialism, and (iii) gender. 
 
3.1.  Behavior in single games 
(i) Age. Figure 1 shows the relative frequency of choosing the egalitarian allocation (1,1) in 
each game across our five different age cohorts. The figure pools data from the in-group and 
out-group conditions as well as from girls and boys, in order to present the overall pattern of 
results.  Figure  1  reveals  important  and  systematic  behavioral  changes  across  age.  In  the 
prosocial game, the relative frequency of choosing (1,1) over (1,0) increases monotonically 
with age. Almost 90% of 16- to 17-year-olds choose the egalitarian allocation, while only 
54% of 8- to 9-year-olds do so. An inverse pattern is found for the envy game. Here we note a 
marked decline of the egalitarian choice from 80% for 8- to 9-year-olds to 40% for 16- to 17-
year-olds. Hence, the altruistic allocation of (1,2) is much more frequently chosen at older 
ages, indicating that tolerance towards disadvantageous inequality increases in older subjects 
(which is similar to the main finding in Almås et al., 2010). We do not find a monotonic age 
effect in the sharing game. On average, only around 10% of subjects in each age group choose 
the (costly) egalitarian allocation (1,1) over (2,0). Hence, when it costs money, the egalitarian 9 
 
choice is selected much less frequently than when it is not costly. Table 4 presents the results 
of  probit  regressions  for  the  three  games  in  which  the  decision  to  choose  the  egalitarian 
allocation (1,1) is the dependent variable. As independent variables, we consider a dummy for 
female and in-group, as well as the ordinal variable agegroup for our five age cohorts (with 
agegroup = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 for grades 3, 5, 7, 9, 11). The results in Table 4 reveal a significantly 
positive age effect for the prosocial game and a negative one for the envy game. 
 
Figures 1 – 3 and Table 4 about here 
 
(ii) Parochialism. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of parochialism. Panel (a) shows that the 
egalitarian allocation of (1,1) is chosen more frequently in the in-group than in the out-group 
from the age of 12 to  13  years onward in the prosocial  game. While Table 4 presents  a 
significant  main  effect  of  in-group,  adding  an  interaction  term  in-group*agegroup  to  the 
specification in Table 4 reveals that the in-group effect is significant only from the age of 12 
years on (p < 0.05). This additional specification is included in Table A2 in the Appendix.
4 
Panel (b) reveals that the decline in the relative frequency of choosing (1,1) is much steeper 
for the in-group than the out-group condition in the envy game. This indicates that as subjects 
get older, they are relatively more willing to accept disadvantageous inequality in the in-group 
than  in  the  out-group  condition.  The  in-group  effect  –  while  non-significant  in  the  main 
specification of Table 4 – is weakly significant for the oldest two age groups of 14- to 15- and 
16- to 17-year-olds (p < 0.1; see Table A2 in the Appendix). In the sharing game in panel (c), 
we note that sharing is, in general, more frequently observed in the in-group than in the out-
group condition. This difference is significant from the age of 10 to 11 years onwards (p < 
0.05; see Table A2).
5 
(iii) Gender. Figure 3 presents the behavior of girls and boys in the three games. While there 
is no clear cut pattern of gender differences at the aggregate level in the prosocial game in 
panel (a), girls are always more likely to choose the egalitarian allocation (1,1) in the envy 
game in panel (b). Table 4 illustrates that the gender effect is significant, and an extended 
model that includes an interaction term of female*agegroup shows that the gender effect is 
                                                 
4 We do not present the extended models with interaction terms in the main body of the text for reasons of 
succinctness. It is noteworthy that the extended models shown in the appendix have a worse fit – according to 
AIC (Akaike information criterion) and BIC (Bayesian information criterion) – than the models shown in Table 
4. 
5 Note that panel (c) of Figure 2 cannot perfectly convey this significant in-group effect in the sharing game, 
especially for 14- to 15-year-old teenagers, since the multiple regression model can control more appropriately 
for the variation in the data than the figure can. 10 
 
present and significant in each single age group (p < 0.05; see Table A3 in the appendix). 
Girls are also more likely to choose (1,1) in the sharing game in each age group, except in the 
oldest one, as can be seen in panel (c) of Figure 3. We note from Table A3 that the gender 
difference is significant for the three youngest age groups, i.e., up to the age of 12 to 13 years. 
 
3.2.  Distribution of other-regarding preference types – Behavior across 
all three games 
Recall from Table 1 the classification of other-regarding preference types from a subject’s 
pattern of choices across all three games. While the three games allow for 8 different choice 
patterns, it is reassuring to note that the five types listed in Table 1 cover the vast majority of 
subjects. In the data presented in figures 4 to 6, between 91% and 100% of subjects belong to 
one of these 5 types. Note also that strongly egalitarian and strongly altruistic types are rare, 
meaning that three types (spiteful, weakly altruistic, and weakly egalitarian) characterize the 
large majority (of at least 76%) of subjects. The infrequency of strong types (versus weak 
types) leads us to pool strongly and weakly egalitarian types, or strongly and weakly altruistic 
types, in the regressions reported in Table 5. 
 
Figures 4 – 6 and Table 5 about here 
 
(i) Age. Figure 4 shows that the relative frequency of egalitarian and spiteful types decreases 
typically with age, while altruistic types become more frequent with age. The modal type is 
the spiteful one for 8- to 9-year-olds, while it is the weakly altruistic type for the 16- to 17-
year-olds.  Table  5  presents  probit  regressions  for  each  type,  confirming  a  significantly 
positive  effect  of  age  on  altruism,  and  a  significantly  negative  effect  on  spitefulness  and 
egalitarianism (p < 0.01 in each case). 
(ii) Parochialism. Comparing the upper and lower panels in Figure 5 reveals that spiteful 
types are always more frequent in the out-group condition than in the in-group condition. An 
extended probit regression (shown in Table A4 in the appendix) shows that parochialism 
becomes significant from the age of 10 to 11 years onwards (p < 0.051 for each age group in 
this range). For altruistic types, we find significant parochialism in 14- to 15- and 16- to 17-
year-olds (p < 0.055 for both age groups; see Table A4). Egalitarian types are the only group 
for which we do not observe any significant difference between the in-group and out-group 
conditions. 11 
 
(iii)  Gender.  Figure  6  shows  marked  gender  differences.  We  note  a  larger  fraction  of 
egalitarian types and a smaller fraction of altruistic types in girls than in boys for each single 
age group. These main effects of gender are documented in Table 5 and also in Table A5, 
with the latter showing that these gender differences in altruism and egalitarianism prevail in 
all age groups except the 8- to 9-year olds (p < 0.05). The only group that fails to show any 
significant gender differences is that of spiteful types. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
We  studied  how  egalitarianism,  altruism,  spitefulness  and  parochialism  change  in  late 
childhood and adolescence. Using a sample of 717 students, and avoiding any kind of self-
selection  into  the  experiment,  we  find  significant  changes  in  the  distribution  of  other-
regarding preferences from the age of 8 to 9 years until the age of 16 to 17 years. While 
previous studies have found that egalitarianism increases sharply in 3- to 8-year-old children 
(Fehr et al., 2008), this motive loses its dominance in adolescence when the altruistic type 
becomes  prevalent.  This  strong  development  of  altruism  in  adolescence  contributes  to  an 
increase in overall efficiency, which is an important prerequisite for smooth interactions later 
on as adults in the workplace. The tendency to accept disadvantageous inequality more often 
later on in adolescence is a mirror finding and confirmation of the recently published work of 
Almås  et  al.  (2010).  The  relatively  strong  decline  in  egalitarian  motives  is  an  important 
qualification of the earlier results by Fehr et al. (2008) for 3- to 8-year-old children, where 
egalitarianism is the overarching motive for 8-year-olds. Our study shows that egalitarianism 
peaks around the age of 8-11 years. Inequality aversion in dictator games may thus be a more 
influential motive relatively early on in life, i.e., in late childhood, while altruistic motives 
become more important in adolescence. In our design, altruism is associated with the motive 
of maximizing the sum of payoffs, a concern that the theory of Charness and Rabin (2002) 
stresses.  Our  evidence  suggests  that  their  theory  becomes  relatively  more  suitable  as  an 
explanation for human behavior when subjects reach their later teenage years.  
We  find  that  the  frequency  of  spiteful  behavior  decreases  strongly  with  age.  The 
incidence of spiteful behavior among the oldest adolescents in our study is fairly similar to 
that  observed  in  adults  (Falk  et  al.,  2005;  Herrmann  et  al.,  2008),  indicating  that  the 
significant changes in the prevalence of spite occur in adolescence and have been captured in 
our study. 12 
 
With respect to gender differences, we found that girls are significantly more likely to 
have egalitarian preferences than boys. In the age group of 16- to 17-year-olds, roughly one-
third of women can be classified as egalitarian, while this is true for less than 20% of men. 
This gender difference with respect to egalitarianism fits with the data of Almås et al. (2010) 
for teenagers, but also with Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2007) who have shown in a large-scale 
newspaper experiment with several thousand adult participants that women care more for 
egalitarian distributions of a pie than men. In our experiment, it is important to note, however, 
that the preference for egalitarian allocations becomes weaker in both men and women as they 
get older. The share of altruistic types increases with age, and it is always significantly higher 
for men than women. No gender differences have been found with respect to the fraction of 
spiteful types. 
A particularly noteworthy finding of our study is the fact that parochialism – i.e., the 
differential treatment of in-group and out-group members – emerges in adolescence. While 
the age in which parochialism becomes significant varies slightly across single games (see 
Table A2), the general pattern emerging from our experiment suggests that the distinction 
between in-group and out-group members becomes behaviorally  relevant in the course of 
socialization in adolescence. Concerning the different types of other-regarding preferences, 
we observe significant in-group favoritism of altruistic types starting at the age of 14 years, 
and spitefulness is significantly stronger towards out-group members from the age of 10 years 
onwards  (see  Table  A4).  One  explanation  could  be  that  the  increasing  exposure  to  and 
membership in new social groups (e.g., in school, clubs, or peer groups) makes the difference 
between  in-group  and  out-group  members  salient  in  the  later  teenage  years,  thus  causing 
different behaviors across in-groups and out-groups. 
Perhaps the most important finding in our study – from an evolutionary perspective – 
is the joint development of altruism and parochialism. The evolutionary model developed by 
Choi  and  Bowles  (2007)  postulates  that  altruism  towards  fellow  group  members  and 
parochialism in the form of hostile acts against out-group members may have evolved jointly 
in  the  history  of  humankind.  This  evolutionary  theory  is  attractive  for  explaining  why 
altruistic  behavior  and  spiteful  behavior  can  co-exist  simultaneously  within  the  same 
individual. The theory is generally hard to test with field data from the historic development 
of societies, however, because it is practically impossible to quantify the level of generosity or 
parochialism in ancient societies. Our experiment can shed light on how the levels of altruistic 
behavior and parochialism change in childhood and adolescence. While our results should not 13 
 
be viewed as a literal test of the evolutionary theory of parochial altruism, it is telling that 
altruism and parochialism develop during the same time period, namely adolescence. 14 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1. Definition of other-regarding preference types 
Type  Prosocial game  Envy game  Sharing game 
Strongly egalitarian  (1/1)  (1/1)  (1/1) 
Weakly egalitarian  (1/1)  (1/1)  (2/0) 
Strongly altruistic  (1/1)  (1/2)  (1/1) 
Weakly altruistic  (1/1)  (1/2)  (2/0) 
Spiteful  (1/0)  (1/1)  (2/0) 
 
   17 
 
Table 2. Sample size 
Age group  Control question correct  Control question wrong  Total 
8/9 years  71  17  88 
10/11 years  207  13  220 
12/13 years  172  3  175 
14/15 years  135  2  137 
16/17 years  132  0  132 
  717  35  752 
 
 
   18 
 
Table 3. Exchange rate and weekly average pocket money 
Age group  Exchange rate of 
1 point 
Increase*  Weekly pocket money 
(average) 
Increase 
8/9 years  0.5 €    2.9 €   
10/11 years  0.75 €  + 50%  4.7 €  + 62% 
12/13 years  1 €  + 33%  6.5 €  + 38% 
14/15 years  2 €  + 100%  13.4 €  + 106% 
16/17 years  3 €  + 50%  23.7 €  + 77% 
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Table 4. Probit regressions with egalitarian choice as dependent variable 
Independent variables  Prosocial game  Envy game  Sharing game 
female   0.027   0.173***   0.053** 
age group
#   0.073***  -0.117***  -0.007 
in-group   0.096***  -0.055   0.071*** 
BIC
§   812.7   920.8   449.6 
# observations   717   717   717 
The table shows marginal effects. 
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
# ordinal variable for the five different age groups (Grade 3 = 0, Grade 5 = 1, Grade 7 = 2, Grade 9 = 3, Grade 11 = 4) 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
   20 
 
Table 5. Probit regressions with other-regarding preference type as dependent variable 
Independent variables  Egalitarian type  Altruistic type  Spiteful type 
female   0.173***  -0.152***  -0.023 
age group
#  -0.047***   0.122***  -0.058*** 
in-group   0.048   0.046  -0.117*** 
BIC
§   916.8   906.0   762.5 
# observations   717   717   717 
The table shows marginal effects. 
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
# ordinal variable for the five different age groups (Grade 3 = 0, Grade 5 = 1, Grade 7 = 2, Grade 9 = 3, Grade 11 = 4) 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
 
   21 
 
























































8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
envy game (1,1) vs. (1,2) prosocial game (1,1) vs. (1,0)
sharing game (1,1) (2,0)
across games22 
 
























































8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
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8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
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8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
outgroup ingroup
(c) sharing game: (1,1) vs (2,0)23 
 
























































8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
male female





















































8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
male female



















































8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
male female
(c) sharing game: (1,1) vs (2,0)24 
 

















































8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
behavioral types
strongly egalitarian weakly egalitarian
strongly altruistic weakly altruistic
spiteful25 
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8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
behavioral types - outgroup
strongly egalitarian weakly egalitarian
strongly altruistic weakly altruistic
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2-tests for behavioral differences in “in-group all” and “in-group half” 
Age group  Prosocial game  Envy game  Sharing game 
8/9 years  p=0.157  p=0.979  p=0.791 
10/11 years  p=0.856  p=0.382  p=0.913 
12/13 years  p=0.678  p=0.083  p=0.923 
14/15 years  p=0.923  p=0.342  p=0.925 
16/17 years  p=0.902  p=0.532  p=0.536 
The table shows that there is no significant difference between the in-group half and the in-group all 
condition at the 5%-level in any of the comparisons. The one weakly significant difference (in the envy 




Table A2. Probit regressions with egalitarian choice as dependent variable – Interaction 
of in-group condition and age group 
Independent variables  Prosocial game  Envy game  Sharing game 
female   0.034   0.170***   0.053** 
agegroup   0.040**  -0.094***  -0.010 
in-group
A  -0.025   0.030   0.064 
in-group*agegroup   0.063**  -0.040   0.004 
BIC
§   813.6   925.7   456.2 
# observations   717   717   717 
A Note that the in-group dummy measures parochialism in 8- to 9-year-olds. The significance of parochialism for the 
remaining four age groups is tested with separate Wald-tests. 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
Wald-tests on the significance of parochialism in each single age group. 
Prosocial game 
H0:  ingroup b + agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.345
B  
H0:  ingroup b +2* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.003
C  
H0:  ingroup b +3* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.000
D 




H0:  ingroup b + agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.851
B 
H0:  ingroup b +2* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.204
C 
H0:  ingroup b +3* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.062
D 




H0:  ingroup b + agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.012
B 
H0:  ingroup b +2* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.001
C 
H0:  ingroup b +3* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.006
D 
H0:  ingroup b +4* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.049
E 
B (C) [D] {E} significance test of parochialism for 10/11 (12/13) [14/15] {16/17} year olds. 29 
 
Table A3. Probit regressions with egalitarian choice as dependent variable – Interaction 
of gender and age group 
Independent variables  Prosocial game  Envy game  Sharing game 
female   0.049   0.153**   0.097** 
agegroup   0.079***  -0.121***   0.001 
in-group   0.095***  -0.054   0.069*** 
female*agegroup  -0.011   0.009  -0.023 
BIC
§   819.1   927.2   454.3 
# observations   717   717   717 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
 
Wald-tests on the significance of parochialism in each single age group. 
Prosocial game 
H0:  female b + agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.367 
H0:  female b +2* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.446 
H0:  female b +3* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.752 
H0:  female b +4* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.965 
 
Envy game 
H0:  female b + agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.001 
H0:  female b +2* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.000 
H0:  female b +3* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.000 
H0:  female b +4* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.007 
 
Sharing game 
H0:  female b + agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.006 
H0:  female b +2* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.012 
H0:  female b +3* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.245 
H0:  female b +4* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.833 30 
 
Table A4. Probit regressions with other-regarding preference type as dependent 
variable – Interaction of in-group condition and age group 
Independent variables  Egalitarian type  Altruistic type  Spiteful type 
female   0.173***  -0.147***  -0.028 
agegroup  -0.045**   0.093***  -0.035** 
in-group   0.054  -0.066  -0.030 
in-group*agegroup  -0.003   0.052*  -0.045* 
BIC
§   923.4   909.7   765.9 
# observations   717   717   717 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
 
Wald-tests on the significance of parochialism for preference types in each single age group. 
Egalitarian type 
H0:  ingroup b + agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.273 
H0:  ingroup b +2* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.187 
H0:  ingroup b +3* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.334 
H0:  ingroup b +4* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.538 
 
Altruistic type 
H0:  ingroup b + agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.786 
H0:  ingroup b +2* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.326 
H0:  ingroup b +3* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.055 
H0:  ingroup b +4* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.039 
 
Spiteful type 
H0:  ingroup b + agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.051 
H0:  ingroup b +2* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.000 
H0:  ingroup b +3* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.000 
H0:  ingroup b +4* agegroup ingroup * b =0  p = 0.001 
 31 
 
Table A5. Probit regressions with other-regarding preference type as dependent 
variable – Interaction of gender and age group 
Independent variables  Egalitarian type  Altruistic type  Spiteful type 
female   0.141**  -0.128*  -0.059 
agegroup  -0.057**   0.128***  -0.068*** 
in-group   0.050   0.045  -0.115*** 
in-group*agegroup   0.017  -0.011   0.019 
BIC
§   923.0   912.4   768.6 
# observations   717   717   717 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
 
Wald-tests on the significance of parochialism for preference types in each single age group. 
Egalitarian type 
H0:  female b + agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.001 
H0:  female b +2* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.000 
H0:  female b +3* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.000 
H0:  female b +4* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.000 
 
Altruistic type 
H0:  female b + agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.006 
H0:  female b +2* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.000 
H0:  female b +3* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.001 
H0:  female b +4* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.013 
 
Spiteful type 
H0:  female b + agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.310 
H0:  female b +2* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.526 
H0:  female b +3* agegroup female * b =0  p = 0.979 





The  experiment  was  run  in  June  2008.  Each  session  lasted  approximately  50  minutes, 
including  the  completion  of  a  post-experimental  questionnaire  and  the  distribution  of  the 
earned money. All subjects received their money in private at the very end of the session.  
Note  that  all  sessions within  a  particular  school  were  run  on  the  same  day.  In  order  to 
guarantee anonymity, we used partition walls and forbade any kind of conversation between 
students. The experimenter memorized the instructions and presented them orally in class at 
the beginning of each session. The instructor paused periodically and let the subjects raise 
their hands for questions which were then answered privately. An English translation of oral 
instructions and of the decision sheets is presented below. 
 
Experimental instructions 
Welcome to our game. Before we start, we will explain the rules of our game to you. From 
now on, please don’t speak to your neighbors and listen carefully. You can earn money in this 
game. We will give you the money in cash at the end of the game. It is important that you 
listen carefully now, to make sure that you understand the rules of our game. We will stop 
frequently during our explanation and allow you to ask questions. Therefore, please raise your 
hand and one of us will come to you to answer your question. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
We will play a game in which you have to decide how to divide money between two 
people. Each of you will get three different decision sheets. We have brought an example 
along. Let’s look at the example together (put the slide on the overhead projector). 
 
(From here on instructions between treatments – outgroup, ingroup all, and ingroup 
half – differ. We first give the instructions for the outgroup and for the ingroup-all treatment, 




You will need to decide how to divide money between yourself and a student from this 
class (point at the picture on the overhead projector). Do you know the students in this class? 
No? (Yes?) This photo shows people from another class in the same grade as you (from your 
                                                 
6 Instructions for the in-group all condition are underlined and in brackets. Instructions for the in-group half 
condition follow below. 33 
 
class). Each student from your class will be randomly matched with one student from this 
other class that is in the same grade. (another student from your class). 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
There are two possible ways to allocate the money: the option on the left-hand side 
and the option on the right-hand side. 
With option “left” you get one point and the student from another class in the same 
grade (your class) with whom you are randomly matched gets no points. One point equals 50 
cents (€0.75, € 1, €2, €3, depending on the age group). With option “right” you get two points 
and the student from another class in the same grade (your class) gets one point. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Depending on which option you want to choose, you check the box at the left- or the 
right-hand side. (Ask a student for his name.) Let’s assume that Markus would like to divide 
the money according to option “right”. Which box would he have to check? Right, the box at 
the  “right”  side.  How  much  would  Markus  earn  and  how  much  would  the  student  from 
another class in the same grade (your class) with whom Markus is randomly matched earn in 
this case? Right, Markus would get €1 (€1.50, € 2, €4, €6, depending on the age group) and 
the student from another class in the same grade (your class) 50 cents (€0.75, € 1, €2, €3, 
depending on the age group). (Write the exchange rate at the blackboard. 0 points = €0, 1 
point = 50 cents, 2 points = €1.) 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
As we mentioned earlier, you will get three decision sheets. The three decision sheets 
differ from each other in the amounts of money that can be divided. At the end of the game 
you will get the money based on your decisions for all decision sheets. We will add up the 
money from all three decision sheets. The student from another class in the same grade (your 
class) with whom you share your money also receives the money from all decision sheets. 
How much money you and the student from another class in the same grade (your class) 
receive depends on your decisions. (Furthermore, you will receive the money which another 34 
 
student from your class decided to give to you. How much you receive in this case depends on 
the other student’s decisions.)  
 
Ingroup half: 
You will need to decide how to divide money between yourself and a student from this 
class (point at the picture on the overhead projector). Do you know the people from this 
class? Yes? This photo shows people from your class. In this game we will randomly match 
groups of two people. In each group we have one “person 1” and one “person 2”. Person 1 
gets to decide how to divide the money between person 1 and person 2. 
Could you please draw a card from this bag? Thank you! What’s your name? Markus, 
in this example you have drawn the role of person 1. You may therefore decide about the 
division of the money in your group. You will need to share the money with one person from 
your class who has drawn the role of person 2. (Ask a student for her name.) Let’s assume 
Julia has drawn that role. You, therefore, do not have to make any decisions in this game. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
There are two possible ways to allocate the money: the option on the left-hand side 
and the option on the right-hand side. 
With option “left”, Markus as person 1 gets one point and person 2 (Julia) gets no 
points. One point equals 50 cents (€0.75, € 1, €2, €3, depending on the age group). With 
option “right” Markus gets two points and Julia gets one point. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Depending on which option Markus would want to choose, he would check the box at 
the left or the right-hand side. Let’s assume that Markus would like to divide the money 
according to option “right”. Which box does he have to check? Right, the box at the “right” 
side. How much would Markus earn and how much Julia in this case? Right, Markus gets €1 
(€1.50, € 2, €4, €6, depending on the age group) and Julia gets 50 cents (€0.75, € 1, €2, €3, 
depending on the age group). (Write the exchange rate at the blackboard. 0 points = €0, 1 
point = 50 cents, 2 points = €1.) 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 35 
 
 
As already mentioned, you will get three decision sheets. However, only students who 
have drawn the role of the person 1 receive these sheets. The three decision sheets differ from 
each other in the amounts of money that can be divided. At the end of the game, person 1 will 
get the money based on his/her decisions for all decision sheets. We will add up the money 
from all three decision sheets. Person 2 also receives the money from all decision sheets. How 
much money person 1 and person 2 receive depends on person 1’s decisions. 36 
 

















               for me   for me 
 
0 Points  1 Point 
Real photo  Real photo 
2 Points  1 Point 37 
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[analogously for the other games] 
1 Point  2 Points 
Real photo  Real photo 
1 Point  1 Point 